FREE ESSAY ON ANSELM OF CANTERBURY

ANSELM OF CANTERBURY

Anselm concludes that one requires two wills to be free by arguing that to be free is to
have an ability. In this paper I will argue that Anselm believes that this ability is
incompatible with an Aristotelian doctrine of the will and that to have this ability, we
must have at least two wills. Only in such a model is one free. Then I will argue that
the agent who abandons justice differs from the one-willed creature Anselm considers in
chapter 13,because the latter is not acting freely, whereas the former is acting freely.
In the 3rd meditation of Meditations on First Philosophy, Descartes thinks he has proved
the existence of God. Given that God is good, and that he exists, Descartes must now
explain why we make mistakes. He argues that we make mistakes because we make judgments
about ideas that are not clear and distinct. If we refrained from making judgments in
those cases, we would not make any errors. This raises a puzzle: Granted that we can
constrain our will when we don't have clear and distinct ideas, can we constrain our will
when we do have clear and distinct ideas? Or are we compelled to judge on things of which
we have clear and distinct ideas? If the latter is the case, then it appears we don't
have a free will which would raise serious issues about responsibility for sin and so
forth.
According to the Aristotelian doctrine of the will, our will is directed towards a single
end, which is happiness. All deliberation that one makes will be in regards to the means
to this single end. There can be no mistake in the direction of the will. If a mistake is
made, it will be in the deliberation process or in the execution of the desired means to
the end. In either case, the mistake will be such that one has no control over it.
Otherwise if one did have control over it then one would simply deliberate the potential
mistake. But, Anselm thinks, since mistakes are made, and they must be explained in terms
of the will since everything is done according to the will, then it would appear that
there must be some sort of malfunction in the way in which we were designed by God. But
he assumes that God did not make an error in the creation of man because doing so would
make God less that perfect.
The general worry in the Aristotelian doctrine of the will is that since there is a
single end, then we can't make opposite judgments because there is only a single will. We
are compelled to act on our will, and that would rule out the possibility of free will,
and responsibility that goes along with free will. In chapter 4, Anselm explains this
problem in discussing how the Devil sinned. He writes,
T. But no one keeps justice except by willing what he ought, and no one deserts justice
except by willing what he ought not.
S. No one doubts this.
T. Therefore, by willing something that he was not supposed to will at that time, he
deserted justice and thereby sinned.
S. This follows. But I ask: What did he will?
T. Whatever he already had in his possession he was supposed to will.
S. Yes, he was supposed to will what he had received from God, and he did not sin by
willing that.
T. Therefore, he willed something which he did not already have and was not supposed to
will at that time. -
S. I cannot deny that this follows.
T. But [the Devil] was able to will nothing except what is just or beneficial. 
The thought is that if we have one end which is happiness, then everything we will is
willed in accordance with this end. Therefore, if the Devil deserted justice, he did it
by willing in accordance with this single end. That being the case, how could his
deserting of justice have possibly been a sin, since it was done in accordance with the
will he had been given by God? The only way the Devil could have sinned was by acting
contrary to his will, which Anselm thinks is impossible if you only have one will. 
What is necessary but absent in the Aristotelian model is the liberty of indifference.
The liberty of indifference is to be able to make a contradictory judgment or refrain
from judgment, even in the face of a powerful inclination. That is to say that even when
the idea is presented to the will by the intellect with clarity and distinctness, the
will is not compelled to judge and can judge otherwise. In the Aristotelian model,
however, mistakes that are made involve irrationality because there is only one will.
Therefore, in order for a mistake not to involve irrationality, Anselm thinks we need two
wills. Otherwise it would appear as though we make irrational mistakes because we are not
rational enough, which would indicate that God erred in his creation of man.
By 'will', Anselm does not mean two distinct instruments for willing. Rather, he proposes
that the will have two inclinations. One inclination is the do what makes us happy
because we seek happiness, and the other inclination is to do what is right because it is
right. The fact that there are two wills makes it possible that we might choose one over
the other. This view makes the liberty of indifference possible because acting contrary
to one will does not make it necessary that we be making an irrational mistake. 
The Anselmian model of two wills allows one to be free because in certain cases we have
the ability to choose one inclination over the other. In the Aristotelian model, since we
could only do what we will to do, there is essentially no freedom to choose since there
is only one will. Freedom implies that there be an ability to choose between two choices,
which entails responsibility. In chapter 5, the teacher says to the student, "You are
certain that if the good angels were not able to sin, then they kept justice not by their
own ability but by necessity. It would follow that they no more merited grace from God
because they remained standing while the others fell than because they preserved
rationality, which they were unable to lose." The teacher seems the think that it is not
appropriate that God give grace to the angels that did not fall if falling was not a
possibility. If their uprightness was guaranteed then there was never a possibility that
they could fall, which would imply that the good angels took no part in their remaining
upright. Yet it seems unwarranted, in this case, that God should give them grace. To
deserve God's grace, it must be the case that the angels chose to remain upright, which
entails that they are upright because of their own ability. So in any given case where
the intellect presents to the will ideas that are clear and distinct, it may be that we
choose between means that which will make us happy, or between means that are just. And
we may also face having to choose between what makes us happy or what is just. In either
case we have the ability to choose, and so we have freedom of will.
It is clear, Anselm seems to think, that Satan sinned because he deserted justice. An
objection might be made that since Satan no longer possesses justice he only possesses
the will for happiness. If he only has the will for happiness, then he can't be
responsible for his sins since he would only be acting then in accordance with the only
will he has. Therefore, he no longer has free will, as in the Aristotelian model. Anselm
disagrees, and in chapter 13 he describes the one-willed creature that would not be
subject to free will. This creature will not be able to will anything other than
happiness since the will for happiness is the only will he has. Furthermore, he will will
to a further degree that which he thinks will bring the greatest happiness. It follows
that since this is the only will he has, he can't stop willing happiness because he would
have to will to stop, and that will is distinct from the will for happiness which has
already been postulated as being the only will. God is the greatest happiness, but this
creature can't be God so he will will any lesser benefits he is able to attain. Anselm
writes,
T. When he willed unclean and very base benefits in which irrational animals take
pleasure, wouldn't this same will be unjust and blameworthy?
S. How would it be unjust and blameworthy, for it would will what it had received not to
be able to keep from willing?
T. However, it is evident that this will is the work of God, whether when it wills the
loftiest benefits or when it wills the basest ones. And it is evident that neither
justice nor injustice is in this will. - Therefore, insofar as [this will] is a being, it
is something good. But as far as justice or injustice is concerned, [this will] is
neither good nor evil.
Since this creature is operating under the only will it has, the justice or injustice of
its actions are irrelevant. In essence, this creature is not acting freely. 
The Devil is given both the will for happiness and justice. Unlike the one-willed
creature, the Devil is free to choose. Anselm writes in chapter 14, "Thus possessing a
just will-for-happiness he could and should be happy. And by not willing what he ought no
to will, although able [to will it], he would merit never to be able to will what he
ought not to will. And by always keeping justice by means of a tempered will, he would in
no way experience need." It happens to be, however, that the Devil realizes that what
would make him happy is to be like God insofar as having an autonomous will. That is to
say, doing things because he wants to do them. But this would require that he abandon
justice, which is to do what God wants him to do because God wants him to do it.
Nevertheless, he believes that although he must abandon justice he will increase his
happiness, and so he chooses to do so. 
The Devil's situation having deserted justice is different from the situation of the
one-willed creature. In chapter 16, Anselm explains,
T. Before that will received this justice, was it under obligation to will and not to
will in accordance with justice?
S. No, it was not under an obligation with respect to what it had not received and
therefore did not have.
T. However, you do not doubt that it was under an obligation after it received [justice]
- unless it were to lose [justice] as the result of some overpowering force?
S. I think that the will is always bound to this obligation whether it keeps what it has
received or whether it willingly deserts it.
The thought is that though having deserted justice it would appear that the Devil is no
longer subject to justice, he ought to have justice and since he no longer has justice
then he is deemed unjust. The one-willed creature was not unjust because it was not the
case the justice should be there, whereas the Devil has deserted justice and in so doing
created a void. In this case, since one can't be happy without being just, the Devil has
made a big mistake and now he is neither just nor happy.
Nevertheless, despite the fact the Devil is operating solely under the will for
happiness, he still has a free will. He realizes that he is mistaken and he wants to
regain justice. But he can never regain justice because that requires that he do the
right thing because it is the right thing to do. The Devil wants to do the right thing
because he wants to be happy. That is to say that he knows he can't be happy without
doing the right thing. Therefore he will never be able to do the right thing because it
is the right thing to do. So he will never regain justice and will always be operating
under the will-for happiness. But this is not to say that he is not operating with a free
will, like the one-willed creature. 
Bibliography
Anselm of Canterbury, On the fall of the devil