FREE ESSAY ON HOW JOSEPH STALIN ACQUIRED POWER

HOW JOSEPH STALIN ACQUIRED POWER

Stalin's rise to power was a combination of his ability to manipulate situations and the
failure of others to prevent him from taking power, especially Leon Trotsky. Trotsky did
not take advantage of several opportunities which would have helped him to crush Stalin
politically. When he failed to take advantage of these opportunities, Stalin maneuvered
himself into a stronger position within the party by allying with Zinoviev and Kamnev. He
manipulated them into crushing Trotsky, thus eliminating the strongest opponent in his
path to power. 
Stalin deftly avoided potential political ruin when Lenin formulated his Testament in
December 1922. Lenin's Testament described what he thought of the future of the Party and
Party leaders, especially Trotsky and Stalin. Lenin warned of a potential split in which
Stalin and Trotsky would be the chief factors. When describing Stalin, Lenin felt that he
had concentrated ...unlimited authority... in his hands and whether he will always be
capable of using that authority with sufficient caution. (Clark 472). 
The content of Lenin's Testament eventually became more detrimental to Trotsky than
Stalin. Coupled with the Lenin incidentally undermining Trotsky, Stalin manipulated the
content of the Testament to enhance his stature. By mentioning Stalin as one of the
prominent members of the Party, Lenin raised Stalin's stature to that of Trotsky. The
equivalent stature of Stalin and Trotsky made Trotsky seem to be less important in
relation to Lenin and thus to the Party apparatus. Further damaging Trotsky, Lenin
described him as possessing ...excessive self-confidence... and overly attracted by the
purely administrative aspects of affairs... (Clark 472) The latter characterization of
Trotsky was one that Stalin employed against him throughout their struggle for power.
Lenin then added a postscript to the Testament on January 4, 1923, characterizing Stalin
as a poor choice for Secretary General by stating, ...Stalin is too rude and this
defect... becomes intolerable in a Secretary General. (Clark 474). Lenin continued on to
state that ...the comrades think about a way of removing Stalin from that post and
appointing another man... (Clark 474). Lenin felt that if the removal of Stalin was not
acted upon, the conflict between Trotsky and Stalin would escalate, which would in turn
endanger the party as a whole. Combined with the Testament, the Postscript could have
served as a tool for Trotsky to obtain power, instead Stalin squashed it in the Central
Committee. 
Another possible advantage left unused by Trotsky was Lenin's disagreement with Stalin on
how to handle the Georgian Affair. During the war with Poland, the Soviet republic signed
a treaty with the Menshevik government of Georgia, ...which solemnly undertook to respect
Georgian independence. (Segal 240). Lenin wanted to maintain that Georgia remained a
...sovereign and independent unit which would have joined the Russian federative state.
(Clark 477). As Commissar of Nationalities, Stalin ordered the suppression of the
Menshevik party in Georgia. In order to achieve his goal, Stalin was preparing a
constitution which was ...to be much more centralistic... and would curtail and abrogate
the rights of the non-Russian nationalities... Also in this new constitution, Stalin was
going to change ...Soviet Federation of republics into the Soviet Union. (Pro 51) 
Through a series of notes, after the postscript, Lenin, with a guilty conscience,
admitted that he had not sufficiently stopped the new oppression of the weak by the
strong and viewed the centralistic nature of Stalin's scheme as being borrowed from
Tsardom and only just covered with a Soviet veneer... (Pro 71). He proceeded to dictate
notes on the Georgian Affair, which were scathing criticisms of Stalin's conduct. He
described Stalin as a truly Russian man, the Great Russian chauvinist, who is
essentially... an oppressor... (Pro 71). 
Lenin communicated to Trotsky that he desired him ...take upon yourself the defense of
the Georgian affair at the Central Committee... (Clark 479) and attached a copy of his
notes on the subject. Warning Trotsky not to show weakness or uncertainty and not to
accept any compromises that Stalin might offer. He stressed the need to avoid warning
Stalin and his associates of the offensive.
Stalin's antagonism towards Trotsky was apparent. He criticized Stalin's performance as
Commissar of Rabkrin by stating that ...it was useless to look to Rabkrin for guidance if
the need arises for any change of policy or for any serious reform in organization...
(Pro 47). Zinoviev, the most popular member of the Politbureau, acted as Lenin's ...loud
and stormy mouthpiece... whos knowledge about the world was unrefined and unpolished...
consequently... leaving him devoured by ambition to rise higher in the party... (Pro 79).
Kamenev, though less popular, was more respected by inner party leaders. Armed with a
more cultivated intellect and a steadier character Kamenev was attracted by moderate
ideas and policies which set him up as Zinoviev's idealistic balance. Their traits
complemented each other and thus they compromised and worked together well. The
combination of these three leaders produced a majority against Trotsky in the
Politbureau. 
Instead of executing Lenin's intentions, he proceeded to accept an undesirable
compromise. Lenin intended on expelling Stalin from the party for at least two years.
Trotsky stated that he ...was against removing Stalin... but he agreed with Lenin in
substance... (Pro90). He wanted Stalin to apologize to Krupskaya, behave more loyally to
his colleagues, and most importantly stop pushing the Georgians around. Stalin accepted
these terms with great enthusiasm. 
Eager to rectify his behavior, Stalin prepared a written statement to the general
congress that denounced the Great Russian Chauvinism that was being exacted upon the
Georgians. The most serious of Lenin's strokes occurred after this. The final stroke was
debilitated him, by paralyzing him, rendering him speechless, and causing him to suffer
from sporadic spells of unconsciousness. The generous terms of Trotsky's compromise and
Lenin's last stroke had multiple effects upon his ability to obtain party leadership and
affected how Stalin pursued his leadership goals. 
Stalin's triumvirate successfully kept Lenin's Testament and Postscript inside of the
Central Committee. Kamenev objected by stating that it should not be published because it
was not a speech given at the Politbureau. (Vol 243) Zinoviev thought that the document
should only be distributed to the Central Committee. Stalin suggested that there was no
reason to publish the document because Lenin did not leave any instructions to. Tomsky,
Solts and Slavatinskaya, all agreed with Zinoviev. The opposition to publication was
apparent and the triumvirate succeeded in suppressing Lenin's documents. 
Further action against Trotsky was being undertaken by the triumvirate. By using his
position as the General Secretary of the Party, Stalin began to install supporters of the
ring in place of Trotsky supporters. Party organizers were employed on the criteria that
they were against Trotsky. Political biographies were being reviewed and references to
Trotsky were being reduced thus slowly eliminating him from important moments in history.
The death of Lenin in January of 1924 allowed the triumvirate to begin to openly attack
Trotsky.
They labeled Trotsky a factionalist. He wrote two letter that gave Stalin and his allies
enough ammunition to render Trotsky politically powerless. In the first letter Trotsky
blamed the Scissors Crisis on ...serious errors of economic and political management...
by the leadership... which was an effect of the extreme worsening of internal Party
conditions was due to the process of bureaucratization that had overwhelmed the Party...

The next letter, named the 'Trotskyist Manifesto,' stated that, ...the Party hierarchy,
increasingly selects the memberships of conferences and congress... changing them into
mere extensions of the hierarchy... and the factionalism must be stopped by those who
instituted it... and a more comradely unit must be installed in order to achieve internal
Party democracy. (Vol 248). 
This letter opened up the opportunity to accuse Trotsky of reverting back to Menshevism.
The Thirteenth Party Congress proceeded to condemn Trotsky and his supporters' opinions
as ...a Menshevik revision of Bolshevism. (Vol249) 
Labeling Trotsky as a factionalist enabled Stalin to finally start to point out how
Trotsky was in disagreement with Lenin and thus was an enemy to the Party. Stalin took
this power and developed himself into the interpreter of Leninism. Stalin worked on
eroding Trotsky's reputation that was built upon the October revolution and the civil
war. He characterized Trotsky's roles in the affairs to be over inflated. Eventually,
after constant political attack, Trotsky was informed that under article 58 of the
criminal code, ...i.e. the charge of counter-revolutionary activity...(Pro 391) he would
be deported to Alma Ata in Turkestan. Expulsion was the last step in Trotsky's failure to
achieve power. He was taken to Constantinople from where he eventually emigrated to
Mexico.
Stalin's ability to take advantage of Trotsky's errors allowed him to move on to crush
the less significant former allies Kamenev and Zinoviev. After eliminating his political
opponents Stalin would not be opposed by anyone until his death.