FREE ESSAY ON INTERNATIONAL LAW

INTERNATIONAL LAW

International law is the body of legal rules that apply between sovereign states and such

other entities as have been granted international personality (status acknowledged by the

international community). The rules of international law are of a normative character,
that 
is, they prescribe towards conduct, and are potentially designed for authoritative 
interpretation by an international judicial authority and by being capable of enforcement

by the application of external sanctions. The International Court of Justice is the
principal 
judicial organ of the United Nations, which succeeded the Permanent Court of 
International Justice after World War II. Article 92 of the charter of the United Nations

states:
The International Court of justice shall be the principal judicial organ of the United 
nations. It shall function in accordance with the annexed Statute, which is based upon
the 
Statute of the Permanent court of International Justice and forms an integral part of the

present Charter.
The commands of international law must be those that the states impose upon themselves, 
as states must give consent to the commands that they will follow. It is a direct 
expression of raison d'etat, the interests of the state, and aims to serve the state, as
well 
as protect the state by giving its rights and duties. This is done through treaties and
other 
consensual engagements which are legally binding.
The case-law of the ICJ is an important aspect of the UN's contribution to the 
development of international law. It's judgements and advisory opinions permeates into 
the international legal community not only through its decisions as such but through the

wider implications of its methodology and reasoning.
The successful resolution of the border dispute between Burkina Faso and Mali in the 
1986 Frontier Dispute case illustrates the utility of judicial decision as a means of 
settlement in territorial disputes. The case was submitted to a Chamber of the ICJ 
pursuant to a special agreement concluded by the parties in 1983. In December 1985, 
while written submissions were being prepared, hostilities broke out in the disputed
area. 
A cease-fire was agreed, and the Chamber directed the continued observance of the 
cease-fire, the withdrawal of troops within twenty days, and the avoidance of actions 
tending to aggravate the dispute or prejudice its eventual resolution. Both Presidents 
publicly welcomed the judgement and indicated their intention to comply with it. In the 
Fisheries Jurisdiction case (United Kingdom v. Iceland , 1974) the ICJ contributed to the

firm establishment in law of the idea that mankind needs to conserve the living resources

of the sea and must respect these resources. The Court observed:
It is one of the advances in maritime international law, resulting from the
intensification 
of fishing, that the former laissez-faire treatment ofthe living resources of the sea in
the 
high seas has been replaced by a recognition of a duty to have due regard of the rights
of 
other States and the needs of conservation for the benefit of all. Consequently, both 
parties have the obligation to keep inder review the fishery resources in the disputed 
waters and to examine together, in the light of scientific and other available
information, 
the measures required for the conservation and development, and equitable exploitation, 
of these resources, taking into account any international agreement in force between 
them, such as the North-East Atlantic Fisheries Convention of 24 January 1959, as well 
as such other agreements as may be reached in the matter in the course of further 
negotiation. The Court also held that the concept of preferential rights in fisheries is
not 
static.
This is not to say that the preferential rights of a coastal State in a special situation
are a 
static concept, in the sense that the degree of the coastal State's preference is to be 
considered as for ever at some given moment. On the contrary, the preferential rights are
a function of the exceptional dependence of such a coastal State on the fisheries in 
adjacent waters and may, therefore, vary as the extent of that dependence changes.
The Court's judgement on this case contributes to the development of the law of the sea 
by recognizing the concept of the preferential rights of a coastal state in the fisheries
of 
the adjacent waters, particularly if that state is in a special situation with its
population 
dependent on those fisheries. Moreover, the Court proceeds further to recognise that the

law pertaining to fisheries must accept the primacy of the requirement of conservation 
based on scientific data. The exercise of preferential rights of the coastal state, as
well as 
the hisoric rights of other states dependent on the same fishing grounds, have to be 
subject to the overriding consideration of proper conservation of the fishery resources
for 
the benefit of all concerned.
Some cases in which sanctions are threatened, however, see no actual implementation. 
The United States, for example, did not impose measures on those Latin American states 
that nationalized privately owned American property, despite legislation that authorizes

the President to discontinue aid in the absence of adequate compensation.
Enforcement measures are not the sole means of UN sanction. Skeptics of the coercive 
theory of international law note that forceful sanctions through the United Nations are 
limited to situations involving threats to the peace, breaches of peace, and acts of 
aggressiion. In all other instances of noncompliance of international law, the charter's

own general provisions outlawing the threat or use of force actually prevent forceful 
sanction. Those same skeptics regard this as an appropriate paradox in a decentralized 
state system of international politics. Nonetheless, other means of collective sanction 
through the UN involve diplomatic intervention and economic sanctions.
In 1967 the Security Council decided to isolate Southern Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe) for 
its policy of racial separation following its unilateral declaration of independence from

Britain. As in other cases of economic sanctions, effectiveness in the Rhodesian
situation 
was limited by the problems of achieving universal participation, and the resistance of 
national elites to external coercion. With respect to universal participation, even
states 
usually sympathetic to Britain's policy demonstrated weak compliance.
The decentralization of sanctions remains one of the major weaknesses of international
law. Although international bodies sometimes make decisions in the implementation of 
sanctions, member states must implement them. The states are the importers and 
exporters in the international system. They command industrial economies and the 
passage of goods across national boundaries.
Furthermore, the UN is wholly dependent on its members on operating funds, so no 
matter what decisional authority its members give it, its ability to take action not only

depends on its decision but also on means. Without the support, the wealth and the 
material assistance of national governments, the UN is incapable of effective sanctions.

The resistance of governments to a financially independent UN arises principally on their

insistence on maintaining control over sanctioning processes in international politics.
Despite sweeping language regarding threats to peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of

aggression, the role of the United Nationsin the enforcement of international law is
quite 
limited. Indeed the purpose of the UN is not to enforce international law, but to
preserve, 
restore and ensure political peace and security. The role of the Security Council is to 
enforce that part of international law that is either created or encompassed by the
Charter 
of the United Nations. When aggression occurs, the members of the Council may decide 
politically - but are not obliged legally - to undertake collective action that will have

sanctioning result. In instances of threats to or breaches of the peace short of war,
they 
may decide politically to take anticipatory action short of force. Moreover, it is for
the 
members of the Security Council to determine when a threat to peace, a breach of peace, 
or an act of aggression has occured. Even thi determination is made on political rather 
than legal criteria. The Security Council may have a legal basis for acting, but
self-interst 
determines how each of it members votes, irrespective of how close to aggression the 
incident at issue may be. Hence by virtue of both its constitutional limitations and the

exercise of sovereign prerogatives by its members, the security council's role as a 
sanctioning device in international law is sharply restricted.
As the subject matter of the law becomes more politicized, states are less willing to
enter 
into formal regulation, or do so only with loopholes for escape from apparent
constraints. 
In this area, called the law of community, governments are generally less willing to 
sacrifice their soverein liberties. In a revolutionary international system where change
is 
rapid and direction unclear, the integrity of the law of community is weak, and 
compliance of its often flaccid norms is correspondingly uncertain.
The law of the political framework resides above these other two levels and consists of
the legal norms governing the ultimate power relations of states. This is the most 
politicized level of international relations; hence pertinent law is extremely primitive.

Those legal norms that do exist suffer from all the political machinations of the states

who made them. States have taken care to see that their behaviour is only minimally 
constrained; the few legal norms they have created always provide avenues of escape 
such as the big-power veto in the UN Security Council.
Despite the many failures and restrictions of international law, material interdpendence,

especially among the states of equivalent power, may foster the growth of positive legal

principles. In addition, as friendships and emnities change,, some bilateral law may
cease 
to be observed among new emnities, but new law may arise among new friends who have 
newfound mutual interests. In the meantime, some multicultural law may have been 
developed. Finally, research suggests that the social effects of industrialization are 
universal and that they result in intersocial tolerances that did not exist during
periods of 
disparate economic capability. On social, political, ane economic grounds, therefore, 
international law is intrinsic to the transformation and modernization of the
international 
system, even though the law of the political context has remained so far.