FREE ESSAY ON IS MODERNISATION INEVITABLE?

IS MODERNISATION INEVITABLE?

Is Modernisation inevitable? by Steve McGraw
Modernisation can be interpreted as growth of a nation in all areas (i.e. social,
economic, political), for example, the aim is 'development of national forms of polity,
the objects of which are to increase the social product with fair shares for all.
Successful models now include Japan and the Soviet Union' (Apter 1965, Preface). Although
this definition is outdated, as the inclusion of the Soviet Union (no longer in existence
and with serious economic and social problems persisting in Russia) and Japan (also
currently in a recession along with most of Asia) illustrates, the ideal of modernisation
is clear. Another approach to the term modernisation is not to take it as an ideal but as
a simple increase in social (literacy, numeracy), economic and political (rationalizing
beaurocracy) standards within a given region (Marglin and Marglin 1990). Whether this
ideal or set of standards is a natural state to which all countries will gravitate is the
question that this essay will attempt to answer. Is the Darwinian theory of evolution
something that can be applied to the great animal that people know as civilisation (or
the nation-state)? Is modernisation the evolution of the species on a different level?
Britain was the first 'modern' nation by these standards, in the sense that
industrialisation of the country resulted in a final shift from an agrarian society
(limited trade) to an industrial society (highly commercial) thereby creating a new
social, economic and political state. This is to say that the 'instrument' (Weiner (ed.)
1966, 7) for modernising Britain was industrialisation, and not that industrialisation
equals modernisation. The British Empire, already being established, grew rapidly due to
the technological innovations derived from industrialisation, colonies were established
in countries without the modern system which Britain had evolved. Thus, it can be derived
that, British colonists who sought to establish political, social and economic systems to
benefit the modernisation of the colony exported the ideal of the modern nation-state to
those countries within the empire.
The majority of these colonial nations as well as those of the other industrialised
nations gained their independence following the end of the Second World War, and were
faced with the problem of attempting to modernise (if that was the objective).
Modernisation often requires 'personalities' (Apter 1965, Hunter 1969, Pye 1966), the
Elite members of Shils' 'new states' (in Geertz (ed.) 1963) sought to create an
acceptable political system whether that took the form of one-party or multiple-parties
by following the colonial political structures that had been established. These largely
peasant societies were traditionally agricultural/agrarian based, much like those found
in 15th Century Europe (Hunter 1969, 4), thereby making the application of established
political practices from far more developed countries a great challenge. As a result of
this; 'Difficulties arise for comparative study because we have enshrined moral
principles in models that have served well in a western political context' (Apter 1965,
15). After all, the global economic and political climate found in 15th Century Britain &
Europe was markedly different to that which surrounded these developing nations.
Therefore the impetus for modernisation comes as much from external forces exerted by
modernised nations as from within the nation itself. So although, as Pye puts it,
'Economic achievement is, for example, directly tied to the spirit of industry and
entrepreneurship of a people..' ( in Weiner (ed.) 1966, 364), nations such as Britain and
the United States exerted pressure on the economies of developing countries for purposes
of trade and international relations. Indeed a 'major goal of United States foreign
policy' was 'the political development' of Third World countries (Wiarda 1989).
Whether this political development has actually occurred, particularly in Africa, is a
matter of great debate (Shaw 1991, Nyang'oro 1989). The images of Ethiopia in the 1980s
where famine was decimating the population, Rwandan civil war and ethnic cleansing, and
the Central African Republic/Congo political leadership struggle have all outlined the
great political, social and economic problems on the continent. In Ethiopia the feudal,
with a few moderations, system has been the dominant political situation since 1941
(Gilkes 1975). The people of many countries in Africa, even those with strong ties to
colonial powers and well-established infrastructure (e.g. Tanzania), may have the
trappings of modern society (e.g. Television and Coca-Cola) without having a stable
political system. As a result of war, famine, lack of diversification and their
exploitation by foreign powers, these nations are in massive debt and cannot modernise
their society (hence the Cancel Third World Debt appeal). This can surely not be
considered modernisation by the westernised standards that are imposed upon the term.
However, it is important to note that these same standards would have classified the
former Soviet Union and the former Yugoslavia as modernised political societies. With the
return to year zero in Russia (in terms of standard of living of the vast majority, and
growth) through the introduction of capitalist values coinciding with the collapse of the
communist regime, this ideal of a modernised society is shattered. Perhaps the inevitable
is mortal in that even modernity comes to an end. Surely the bloody warfare that
continues in Yugoslavia, sanctioned by the government, cannot be considered an
'authoritative allocation of values 1 for society' that Easton (1965) envisaged as the
central function of a political system. Perhaps these discrepancies can be explained by
the fact that it is difficult to separate the 'strands of traditionalism' in the case in
study from 'strands of modernity' (Apter 1985, 98). Although another argument is perhaps
more to the point, the concept of modernity does not necessarily apply to those countries
around whose political frameworks it was based (i.e. The United States and to a lesser
extent the United Kingdom). To elaborate, it becomes necessary to adapt one's view of the
modernisation process to a more generalised principle whereby differing political
approaches can also lead to a more modern nation state. Lucian Pye (1966, 117) suggested
'think of the countries as possessing not a single and integrating political process but
many only loosely related political processes', the topic was specifically south-east
Asia but the principle is to deal with each locality as affected by its environment and
history. Taking this as read, then all nations will exhibit different processes of
modernisation, depending on the internal and external forces that create their particular
political structure.
So to answering the question, is modernisation inevitable? Obviously the question is
wholly unanswerable without first glimpsing the future, although a few predictions may be
made. The modern society, as aforementioned theorists saw it in the 1960s and 70s, may
well be an unattainable goal for today's less developed nations. With their independence
from imperial powers these nations have found their ability to shape their future,
whether it will be the same future which the Europeans and Americans reached is
altogether a different matter. The cultural, environmental and historical differences
between these nations and the models for modernity may be too great. Also the increased
influence of external powers on the developing nations through tourism, communications,
trade and ideology means that the conditions in which the modernisation of countries like
Britain occurred are not being reproduced. Less developed countries are not being given
sufficient time to grow in all three aspects of modernisation. The 'help' which these
countries have received toward the goal of modernity has resulted, albeit through the
best of intentions, in national debt and their peripheralisation in a capitalist world.
Thereby rendering many nations dependent on the developed world.
However, if the model of modernisation is not strictly adhered to, it can be seen that
countries such as Thailand (where the Baht went through a recent crises) and Egypt are
finding their own form of modernity. In essence, modernity is what the populace of a
country and its political commentators make of it. The likelihood of all countries
eventually reaching the ultimate stage of modernity is slim, because the evolution of the
species depends on its adaptation to its environment. The earth does not present a
homogenous environment, nor have the pioneering colonists created one, and so the chances
of a homogenous polity are also slim. The modernity which less-developed countries reach
will more than likely differ greatly from the idealogical viewpoint which theorists have
suggested, but it will be modernity none the less. In summation, all nations will change
whether of their own accord or through external pressures, and all will become more
modern in terms of advancing their own economic, political and social structures. So,
yes, modernisation is inevitable but 'modernisation' is not.
Endnotes:
1. Emphasis added