FREE ESSAY ON LATIN AMERICAN POLITICS

LATIN AMERICAN POLITICS

Present Political Problems of Three Latin American Countries:
Colombia, Venezuela and Ecuador 
Latin American countries have experienced different trajectories, which have made their
political transitions very unique, and have also influenced and contributed to the
present political problems of each particular country. As a result of these problems,
most of Latin American countries' political and social stability are now in great
disorder. Three interesting cases worth exploring are the ones of Colombia, Venezuela and
Ecuador. These countries have all been victims of authoritarianism, caudillsm, weak party
systems, constitutional problems, corruption, and other factors that together derive
their current political situations. Therefore, in order to comprehend their present
political conditions and their effect on society we need to analyze the different trends
of their transitions to democracy and how these have influenced their current political
situations. 
First, lets consider the Colombian case. It is important to recall that Colombia was able
to achieve its transition to a final democracy after surpassing one of the most dramatic
periods of its history, which was very notorious for its violent era popularly known as
La Violencia. After being governed by civilians for many years, Rojas Pinilla overthrew
the government in the 1950's and lead Colombian politics with an autocratic regime until
1957, when Liberals and Conservatives signed an agreement make a coalition government
(Frente Nacional) and overthrow Pinilla from power. Ever since, the two democratic
parties had shared governmental power until 1974 when Colombian first presidential
elections took place. In other words, Colombian real transition to democracy was
initiated in 1957; however, its democracy was not established until 1974. However, it is
very significant to acknowledge that the democratic rule in Colombia has been difficult
to sustain because of the influence of violence and corruption from the Guerrilla
movement, Paramilitary groups, and drug trafficking lords. 
In addition, Colombia's political system has been different from other Latin American
countries in the sense that it has a long history of partidist politics, usually fair and
regular elections, and the respect for political and civil rights. Colombia has had two
traditional predominant parties--the Liberals and the Conservatives-that have competed
for power since the mid-nineteenth century and have rotated frequently as the governing
party. Moreover, Colombia's conservative Roman Catholic Church traditionally has been
more influential than the military not only in electing presidents and influencing
elections, but also in the political socialization of its population. 
Additionally, the Colombian military has become somewhat more assertive in national
security decision-making as a result of the growing and more unified Guerrilla insurgency
and the increasing terrorism from drug traffickers. However, Colombia has had a long
tradition of military subordination to civilian authority. On many occasions during the
1970's and 1980's military leaders attempted to challenge civilian authority and failed
as the incumbent president dismissed them. 
At the same time, a contradictory feature of Colombia's long democratic tradition has
been its high level of political violence that started on the 1940's and its has
continued until today. This violence includes left-wing insurgency and terrorism,
right-wing paramilitary activity, and narcoterrorism. Consequently, Colombia currently
leaves under a constitutionally authorized state of siege invoked to deal with civil
disturbances, insurgency, and terrorism. For instance, as a result of the violence in
Colombia, during the mid-1980's there was this political atmosphere in which the
government was losing control over the country's rampaging violence. It was perceived
that even if the Guerrillas laid down their arms, violence by narcotics traffickers,
death squads, and common criminals would continue to bring terror to the political and
social arenas. 
The nation's violent legacy has been attributed in part to the elitist nature of the
political system. The members of this traditional elite have competed bitterly, and
sometimes violently, to achieve power and control of the government, through the two main
parties; the Liberal Party and the Conservative Party, which became the Social
Conservative Party in July 1987. Unlike their counterparts in other Latin American
countries, Colombia's Christian democratic, social democratic, and Marxist parties were
always weak and insignificant. 
In addition, Constitutional amendments and the evolution of Colombia's political culture
reinforced its highly centralized and elitist governmental system. The elite managed to
retain control over the political system by designating representatives of the middle
class, labor class, and the peasantry. 
Furthermore, the Guerrilla insurgency has been only the most visible dimension of a far
deeper problem confronting the Colombian political system: the progressive erosion of the
regime's legitimacy as a result of its failure to institutionalize mechanisms of
political participation. Likewise, there is also the legitimacy problem reflected in
rising levels of voter abstention, mass political apathy and cynicism, as well as in the
declining rates of voter identification with either of the traditional parties.
On the other hand, we have the case of Venezuela. Similarly to Colombia, the Venezuelan
transition to democracy started with the signing of an agreement. In this case, it was
the Punto Fijo agreement, signed in 1958 by the two most prominent democratic parties AD
and COPEI. As a result of this accord, the two parties consolidated their power and as a
result of a joint effort along with some members of the military, were able to establish
a democratic rule, putting an end to military power. Ever since 1958 until very recently,
the democratic parties were able to dominate the Venezuelan government. However, as the
major countries of Latin America worked their way out from authoritarianism through
transition to democracy, and hopefully toward democracy's consolidation, Venezuela, has
moved in the opposite direction. Since its democratization, its political arena and
social peace remained stable for many decades until the end of 1980's. At the beginning
of 1989 Venezuela's democratic order was shaken by the disaffection of its citizens, the
decay of the two main political parties and state institutions, attempted coups, and the
impeachment and removal of the president, Carlos Andres Perez, in 1993.
Moreover, looking it from a regional perspective, Venezuelan politics has been working
backwards in the last decade. Instead of consolidation of democracy, it has been,
however, a continuous decay and decomposition of political parties and state
institutions, which has been the result of bad administration, corruption, lack of
education among other factors. As a result, Venezuelan citizens started loosing faith on
the people that were in charge of the country, as well as their bureaucratic
institutions. In addition, instead of a military withdrawing from government, the armed
forces have been coming out of the barracks to popular claim. 
It is hard to believe how a country with such an immense amount of wealth was not able to
maintain its position, its political and social stability, and its general development.
The reality is that it is not the country's fault, but the people who were in control of
its wealth. This mismanagement of the country's wealth resulted in the decline of its
political institutions, in economic inflation and in popular discontent. In addition,
other reasons for the Venezuelan political problems are compounded by the elements that
were critical to the origins and long term stability of the political system, namely,
strong parties, low social conflicts in a managed civil society, and a dominant State
economically sustained only by its oil revenues.
Additionally, the party systems' crisis and decay were worsened by rigidities deeply
rooted in the state structure. The collected and disbursed petroleum revenues made the
country a major source of employment, consumption, production, and credit. However, it
also represented a major source for corruption. A large State is not necessarily powerful
and autonomous, and it may be usual that it does not use all its resources for the
betterment of the entire society, but to benefit a small portion of it. Hence, the
immense size and the extensive role of the Venezuelan State has been beneficial for
powerful interest groups in the sense that they can have access to policy making and
public funds. Throughout the years, those revenues have been misused and have created an
incredible instability in the whole Venezuelan system. 
Furthermore, given the fact that the president has always been more powerful than the
Congress, interest groups have sought to influence the executive branch. As a result, the
State does not have the technical capacity or political inclination to carry the policies
and interest groups and party elites have achieved total control over the State. 
Finally, Venezuelan crisis can be visualized as a case where the transition has remained
stagnated. Therefore, a new order of politicians is struggling to be born because the old
older remained very strong and is unwilling to die. New leaders, such as Hugo Chavez
(current president) have been able to emerge. Chavez is now the result of decades of bad
administrated politics, a political crisis with a hopeless and desperate society looking
for a drastic change, a rejection of the old political parties. Thus, he is now
responding to the popular call for this new political and popular leader. He is now
trying to establish a new constitution and has taken the whole power in his hands to, as
he says, bring an end to the past rigid institutions and powerful elites who have had
total control over the country, and start a new successful Venezuela. 
Lastly there is the Ecuadorian case. When analyzing Ecuador's transitions to democracy,
we find a significantly different trend from the other two Andean countries just studied.
Although Ecuador commenced its transition to democracy with four successive democratic
elections from 1948 to 1960, it was not until the 1980's that the country really
experienced a relative political stability under a democratic rule. In fact, in its real
dimension, it was not until Ribadeneyra was elected president in August 1984 that the
re-establishment of democracy in Ecuador appeared to be affirmed. Nonetheless, the nation
had only a formalistic and ritualistic democratic tradition, as Roldos himself had
concerned shortly before taking office. 
Indeed, Ecuador has been shaken periodically since 1984 by bitter conflicts between the
executive branch on the one side and the unicameral legislature and the judiciary on the
other. These clashes were particularly pronounced during Febres Cordero's polemical
administration. His authoritarian rule also provoked military mutinies and even his brief
kidnapping by rebellious troops. Although battered, Ecuador's democratic system survived,
and Febres Cordero transferred power to his long-time rival, Rodrigo Borja Cevallos, in
August 1988. Whereas Febres Cordero, a millionaire businessman from Guayaquil, had
advocated a free-market economy, strong executive control, and close alignment with the
United States, Borja, a social democrat from Quito, adopted a mixed economy, a pluralist
government, and a nonaligned foreign policy. In his first two years, Borja succeeded in
softening the impact of his predecessor's legacy of political, economic, and social
crises. 
Despite a decade of civilian democratic rule marked by three peaceful transitions of
governments, the political system remained vulnerable. The transition to a third
democratic government in 1988 provided little reason to believe that the fragile
democratic system in Ecuador had been strengthened, nor that the historic pattern of
instability had been fundamentally reversed or modified. 
The destabilizing conflicts among the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of
government resulted primarily from the peculiarity of Ecuador's institutional structure.
For example, the judiciary system, despite of being independent, lacked the authority
needed to serve as an effective check on the abuse of presidential powers. Although the
Supreme Court of Justice carried out many judicial duties normally expected of a nation's
highest court, it did not rule on constitutional issues. This was a major problem.
In addition, the traditional, deep-seated division between the liberal, trade-oriented,
tropical Costa and the conservative, agrarian-oriented Sierra also helped explains
Ecuador's bitter infighting over political and economic affairs. This fundamental
division putted the Pacific port city of Guayaquil, the country's principal economic
center, against the highland capital of Quito. The enmity between citizens from Guayaquil
and citizens from Quito was reflected in the alignment of the country's sixteen
registered political parties, in the 1988 elections. 
Furthermore, another major source of political conflict was the rivalry among provinces
and regions for central government attention in the form of development projects,
principally road construction. Finally, although Ecuador's political parties and its free
and partisan press participated in a lively and contentious democratic political process,
parties suffered from factionalism, weak organization, lack of mass participation, and
blurred ideologies, as well as from the competing influences of populism and militarism.

As a result of the combination of these facts, together with an incredible amount of
corruption from the last three administrations and the bank owners, an internal and
external debt, and a lack of confidence from investors, Ecuador is now facing the worst
economic and political crisis in Latin America. The last presidents are now exiles since
they were engaged in a lot of corruption. In addition, there is a very weak
multipartidism and a continuous confrontation between the legislative and the executive
branches. Moreover, in order to pay the incredible external dept and please the IMF
requirements, the government froze the people's savings accounts and used them. In
addition, there is an incredible hyperinflation and many government workers, teachers,
and other social workers are in strike, as they are not being paid. Thus, we can say that
currently there is a great discontent from the Ecuadorian people that is bringing much
pressures to the government, as the whole country is in a stage of emergency that results
from past and current political and economical factors that create instability and should
be fixed.