FREE ESSAY ON MACINTYRE AND DETERMINISM

MACINTYRE AND DETERMINISM

Behavior is quite an interesting aspect of man to observe. All day long we demonstrate
diverse types of behavior, from eating certain foods to speaking in certain ways. But of
most interest is rational behavior. Behavior is rational if, and only if, it can be
influenced, or inhibited by the adducing of some logically relevant consideration.
(p.297) In his essay MacIntyre tries to show us that rational behavior is not causally
determined, but that it comes out of our free will.
The discovery of causal explanations for our actions, and the like, shows, or tries to
show, that we could not have done other than what we did. From this, then, there would be
no point to morality, which has been at the forefront of human thought for ages. But then
again, to say the human behavior is inexplicable is to deny all that we have learned from
the sciences.
We have already given the definition for rational behavior, but in this definition we
find a point which must be clarified, that of a logically relevant consideration. What
exactly is a logically relevant consideration? Well, that is logically relevant will
necessarily vary from case to case. And it can vary so much that MacIntyre even goes as
far as saying that the task of philosophy might almost be defined as the task of defining
'logical relevance'. (p. 297) Rational behavior is then said to be defined with reference
to the possibility of altering it by some logically relevant consideration. Thus, to show
that a behavior is rational is enough to show that it is not causally determined, in the
sense of it being the effect of certain conditions outside of a person's control.
Being that there is rational behavior, it must follow that there is such a thing
non-rational behavior. Non-rational behavior is, of course, behavior which does not take
logically relevant considerations into account. Such an act can be said to be impulsive.
As in all philosophical discourse the opposing party usually proposes a counter-attack.
In this case, the determinist has launched a three-stage counter attack against free
actions. Firstly the determinist argues that, in the widest sense of the word cause, the
giving of a reason may function as a cause. MacIntyre argues against this by saying that
to act because you were given reasons to act would not necessarily be to act in a
causally determined way. (p. 299) For, in terms of the concept of rational behavior, we
can certainly differentiate between a giving of reasons which is causally effective and a
giving of reasons which is rationally effective.
The determinist then moves to the second stage of his argument. He will say that there
are empirical grounds for believing that we can always be mistaken about rational
behavior. It may seem like the behavior is influenced by rational considerations when, in
fact, it is completely determined by antecedent causes. To disprove this MacIntyre says
that such antecedent causes would only determine the event in the absence of logically
relevant conditions. In other words, if a logically relevant idea were offered to
contradict the event about to take place, it is most likely that reason would take over
and prevent that event from occurring.
We now come to the determinist final attempt to disprove the act of free will. He might
suggest that advances in learning theory, for example, might teach us that rational,
intelligent behavior was nothing more than well-drilled behavior, of which a complete
causal account could be given, only provided that that account was sufficiently complex.
(p. 300) But how can this be? There are two problems in this suggestion. For one thing, a
man might one day decide to stop being immoral. He may weigh out the pros and cons of a
situation and decide to go with what is moral. Secondly, if determinism is to rest its
hopes on such a complex pattern of explanation then it becomes very hard to either verify
or disprove it. MacIntyre provides us with an example. Suppose that the determinist is
able to formulate a complete explanation of my behavior in causal terms. But also suppose
that my behavior is rational. Now what test can determine whether I acted because I was
rational or because my behavior was just causally determined?
Determinism, as can be seen, is not the best of arguments. It can work in some instances,
but not in all, which is what it proposes to do. Some actions can be determined just by
causal explanations, but these are only very few.