FREE ESSAY ON PELOPONNESIAN WAR STRATEGIES

PELOPONNESIAN WAR STRATEGIES

Just before the Peloponnesian War began, Pericles of Athens and King Archidamus of Sparta
provided net assessments of the comparative strengths and weaknesses of the two sides.
Evaluate their projections.
A study of the strategies and projections of King Archidamus of Sparta as compared to
those of Pericles of Athens reveal Archidamus' understanding of the superiority of land
power as a basis for success at sea in the ancient Mediterranean - as well as Pericles'
naivete as to this tenet. 
Background
The Peloponnesian War between the city-states of Athens and Sparta (and their respective
allies) lasted from 431-404 BC. Conflicts between the two cites dated back further,
however, with skirmishes from 460-445 effectively ending in a draw. Major fighting in the
Peloponnesian War occurred from 431-421 and ended in Athenian victory. Renewed conflict
raged from 413-404, ultimately concluding in Spartan victory. 
An understanding of these very different cultures is illustrative of their leaders'
ultimate strategies and projections before the conflict. At the time of the war, Greece
was divided into two great alliances. Sparta dominated the Peloponnesian League, an
alliance in the Peloponnese region. These allies included small states close enough to
the militant Sparta to be easily controlled; stronger (and more remote) states over which
Sparta still had considerable influence; and the truly strong, independent cities of
Thebes and Corinth. 
Spartan dominance rose from its unquestionable position as the preeminent continental
army of the region. The farming and manual labor of the city was provided by slaves,
which freed the male citizens to serve in the army. Spartan boys were all trained to
serve in the military as professional soldiers, with individual and family needs
subordinated to the needs of the state.
The Athenian Empire was a more voluntary alliance of city-states that were impressed by
the Athenian Navy's prowess in the Persian War and were willing to pay for its
protection. Athens used this revenue to further improve its navy, as well as improve its
own infrastructure and defenses. Included in these improvements was the construction of
large walls around the city and down to the port at Piraeus, home of the Athenian Navy. 
The open Athenian democracy stood in stark contrast to the strict oligarchy of Sparta. A
political, philosophical and cultural center, Athens' power and prosperity depended on
its command of its great maritime empire, which was centered on the Aegean Sea. Its navy
grew along with the alliance.
There was an increasing concern in the Peloponnesian League that Athens' rapid growth was
an opportunistic exploitation of Athenian allies and a direct threat to the League.
Well-founded or not, these fears came to a head in 432, when Spartan allies lobbied hard
for the League to check Athenian growth by declaring war. At these debates, a Spartan
ally from Corinth chastised the perceived aggressive expansion of Athens, stating
(Athenians) are by nature incapable of either living a quiet life themselves or of
allowing anyone else to do so. 
Spartan Strategy
It was at this point in the debates that Sparta's King Archidamus revealed his wisdom in
both politics and war fighting. Noting Athens' naval superiority and expansive financial
resources, he was fully aware that a conflict could not end quickly. I fear, he
explained, that it is more likely that we shall be leaving (this war) to our children
after us. Archidamus knew well the tenet proffered by the great Chinese military
strategist Sun Tzu centuries before, who stated, Victory is the main object in war. If
this is long delayed, weapons are blunted and morale depressed. When troops attack
cities, their strength will be exhausted. A protracted campaign would not be good for
Sparta.
A delay in actually beginning warfare, however, would aid the Spartan cause. Archidamus
proposed drawing out diplomatic efforts at reconciliation in order to buy time for
preparations. He then proposed courting new allies with the specific goal of increasing
naval and financial resources. He was keenly aware that the mightiest army in the world
could not win without naval support.
Archidamus did not suppose that he could match the Athenian Navy, however, no matter how
many new allies Sparta courted. His strategy instead was to use his army to dominate
Athenian allied cities and take all Athenian land outside the walled city of Athens - in
effect, hold it hostage. He would then use his navy to block Athens' main external source
of grain supplies from Crimea. Corinthian allies proposed additional tactics, including
the establishment of fortified camps on seized Athenian lands and fostering revolts among
Athenian ally cities, which would choke off revenue to the war chest. 
War was still not Archidamus' hope, and his suggestion for extensive diplomatic efforts
at resolution was not purely tactical stalling. Indeed, envoy after envoy was sent to
Athens proposing various terms of compromise, but Athens, and in particular Pericles, was
unwilling to make concessions.
Athenian Strategy
Much of Athens' unwillingness to compromise stemmed from the supreme confidence Pericles
had in both his navy and his overall strategy. He knew the Spartan Army was without peer
and anticipated the seizure of Athenian lands outside the city walls. In fact, he even
proposed that Athenians lay waste to their own lands to deny the Spartan army resources
and the opportunity to do so itself; but he knew this was an unrealistic request of the
people. Pericles intended to draw citizens inside the protective walls to wait out the
Spartan advance. 
At the same time, the mighty Athenian Navy would both conduct offensive raids on Spartan
coastal assets and bring in supplies at the port at Piraeus. Pericles explained that if
the Athenians would remain quiet, take care of their fleet, refrain from trying to extend
their empire in wartime and thus putting their city in danger, they would prevail. In
other words, the best offense is a good defense. This conservative strategy, too, has
support from Sun Tzu, who noted that invincibility lies in the defense; the possibility
of victory in the attack. 
Comparison Of Strategies
Reviewing King Archidamus' projections, from both his perspective and with the benefit of
hindsight, reveal his sagacity. Archidamus was keenly aware of Sparta's main weakness -
its navy - and took affirmative steps before engaging in battle to address the problem.
He delayed engagement for this purpose, but also to allow cooler heads to prevail after
the heated debates demanding a swift attack on Athens. Archidamus knew that a victorious
army wins its victories before seeking battle; an army destined to defeat fights in the
hope of winning. 
This tactic makes sense from a practical standpoint as well. In comparison, it would be
easier for a nation to acquire or ally with a navy in some form than to acquire an army.
Buying ships is easier than buying soldiers. Archidamus could not hope to acquire a navy
equal to Athens', but he did not need such a fleet. He did not need to defeat the entire
Athenian Navy; he only needed to complete the choke-hold on Athens begun by his army
outside the city walls.
Pericles' strategy, on the other hand, had problems from the onset. While Archidamus
sought to shore up his weak navy, Pericles made no attempt to shore up his weak army; and
as strong as the Athenian Navy was, it did not pose a major threat to the city of Sparta.
The ancient ships of the era did not pose a threat of shore bombardment or major
amphibious landings. While Athenian forces made raids and even established small coastal
bases in Spartan territory, these forays were unable to inflict sufficient damage to aid
the Athenian fight. 
In addition, crowding the Athenian populace into the walled city created a great risk of
infectious disease. Indeed, a terrible plague wrought havoc on the besieged city from
430-429 and again in 427. Pericles himself fell to the plague in 429. The extent to which
this amounts to Monday morning quarterbacking is uncertain; but at the bare minimum,
Pericles seems to have underestimated the extent of the hardships his strategy would
bring on the people.
The author and historian Donald Kagan expanded on this point. First, he noted that the
plan lacked credibility. Pericles asked Athenians to passively hide behind the walls and
watch the Spartan Army level their farms and homes. He asked them to tolerate the insults
and accusations of cowardice the enemy would hurl at them from beneath their walls. 
Secondly, in a related theory, Kagan noted that this strategy flew in the face of Greek
habit and culture. Indeed, Athens abandoned this strategy after Pericles died in 429.
This is not to say that the plan was unsuccessful to that point - but it was un-Athenian
to just do nothing and wait. 
Alternative Analysis
Athenian tactics in the years following Pericles' death resulted in the near-total loss
of the fleet and eventual victory for Sparta. These facts certainly lend credibility to
Pericles' defense-based strategic principles, which were by no means foolhardy. He
correctly observed that a power dominant by sea can do certain things which a land power
is debarred from doing; as, for instance, ravage the territory of a superior, since it is
always possible to coast along to some point, where either there is no hostile force to
deal with or merely a small body. 
In addition, Pericles knew the Spartan culture. He knew that it was a tumultuous
city-state where the risk of rebellion by the slave population was always a real threat.
When a great armed force marched out of the city, the risk of rebellion grew
exponentially. If enough Spartan forces were busy pounding their fists against the thick
walls of Athens, it is not inconceivable that Athens could set up camp on the Spartan
coast and launch a successful offensive campaign from there - particularly if Spartan
slaves could be turned against their masters.
Conclusion
Pericles' projections and strategies were sound in principle, but as Kagan explained,
they were too difficult in practice because they flew against human nature. Further,
Pericles did not seem to share King Archidamus awareness of the war's inevitable
duration. The negative impact on Athenian morale must have been profound as their homes
and farms were destroyed, their friends and family fell to the plague, and the war
dragged on for yet another generation.
King Archidamus, on the other hand, realized the protracted nature of the engagement. He
worked hard to avoid it and harder to prepare for it. By realizing Sparta's own
weaknesses early and aggressively seeking ways to ameliorate them, he showed sound
leadership and tactical prowess. Sun Tzu would have approved.
Bibliography
Gray, Colin S. The Leverage of Sea Power. The Free Press: New York, NY. 1992.
Kagan, Donald. On The Origins of War. Doubleday: New York, NY. 1995.
Sun Tzu (translated by Samuel B. Griffith). The Art Of War. Oxford University Press: New
York, NY. 1971.
Thucydides (translated by Rex Warner). History of the Peloponnesian War. Penguin Books:
New York, NY. 1972.